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The starting point of this paper is a universally observed tendency of common property to be
replaced by private property in traditional agriculture. The paper seeks to explore the forces behind
such a development. Four different theoretical approaches are discussed: neo-institutional
economics, which focuses on increasing land value; Marxian, class-based explanations; a state-Iocal
perspective, focusing on predatory state intervention and lack of respect for customary law; and a
cultural explanation based on a "commoditization of land" hypothesis. These approaehes are
discussed in relation to the development in the study area in Sumatra. A framework which integrates
elements of all approaehes is outlined, using a "demand and supply for institutional change"
metaphor. In particular, the neo-institutional and the state-Iocal approaehes are found to be relevant
to explain the evolution of private property rights. The paper also develops a formal analytical
model which endogenizes farmers' decisions about tenure security.
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1 Introduction: The Evolution of Private Property Rights (EPPR)
hypothesis i
"In the long course of historical development, economic societies can be viewed as moving
in a general way from C (common property) to P (private property)" (Cohen and Weitzman,
1975: 310).
The starting point for this paper is a general observation of the replacement of common
property by private property rights to natural resources. This seems to be valid both as a
generalisation throughout history, as well as a description of proeesses taking place in
many developing countries today. There exists a number of examples of successful
management of resources held in common (e.g., Ostrom, 1990). My purpose is not to
question these studies, indeed this paper should be complementary as it explores the
forces that could lead to the weakening or disappearance of common property regimes.
A general proposition on the evolution of private property rights (EPPR) raises a
number of relevant research questions:
1. To what extent is this proposition universally valid?
2. What are the forces behind such a development?
3. What are the effects on particularly economic efficiency (economic growth) and
equity?
4. How can governments influence this development, either to limit, redireet, or
promote and facilitate it depending on the governments' objectives?
This paper wil mainly address the sec ond question, but touch upon the three others,
particularly the forth one in relation to the case study. The first question relates to a
more fundamental one: is common property just a temporary stage in a more or less
natural and optimizing evolution towards private property rights over natural resources?
Jf yes, trying to preserve common property regimes may have negative consequences on
both the productivity and the environment, as argued by Ault and Rutman (1979) in the
context of land rights in Africa.2 While this paper does not pursue the question on the
universal validity of the EPPR hypothesis, our tentative answer would be a conditional
"yes" for resources where exclusion is possible (i.e., has relative low costs). For
resources with high exclusion costs, it may not be the case.
The discussion of the EPPR wil focus on traditional agricultural societies, where
typically some form of communal management of common property land is gradually
moving towards a system of more individualized and well defined property rights.
Compared to many natural resources, land is generally not a public good (non-rivalry in
consumption), and the exclusion costs may be manageable (unlike for resources like
fish, air, etc.). There is rivalry in land use, and exclusion is possible at reasonable costs.
i An early version of this paper was presented at the Fifh Common Property Conference:
Reinventing the Commons, the International Association for the Study of Common Property,
24-28 May 1995, Bodø, Norway. I am grateful for discussions with and/or comments to the
paper made by Turid Bøe, Rögnvaldur Hannesson, Lars Gule, Are Knudsen, Ottar Mæstad,
Karl R. Pedersen, Ussif Rashid Sumaila, and Arne Tostensen.
2 This view wiU be discussed further in section 3.3.
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How can the EPPR hypothesis be formulated more precisely? In this paper we argue that
the EPPR implies a development characterized first and foremost by individualization:
more rights are mo ved from the community to individuals (or households). Related to
this are three other phenomena: there is a specification of the rights in the way that they
become more explicit and detailed; there is aformalization in the way that the rights are
increasingly embedded in the statutory law, not (only) customar law; and there is a
securing of the rights for the rightholder. The latter could be made operational in the
way that the risk (probability) of losing the land is reduced, but this would not always be
the case as increased scarcity is associated with increased competition and claims from
others. Rather it is the rightholder's efforts to protect the land that increase.
The evolution of private property rights is a central theme in the classical work on
agricultural evolution by Boserup (1965). Her focus was on the role of population
growth in inducing agricultural intensification and the accompanying changes in the
property regime. However, "there has been litte systematie empirical research on the
development ofproperty rights arrangement" (Alston et al., 1995: 90).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two provides a discussion of the
meaning of property rights, and of different property rights regimes. In section three I
present four different views or positions on the EPPR: the neo-institutional economics
(NIE) approach, where land value is a key explanatory factor; a Marxian, class-based
explanation; a state - local perspective, including the tension between customary and
statutory land law; and a cultural (ideological) explanation. These are not separate
analytical approaehes, nor are they mutually exclusive. The classification, however,
relates to different positions and approaehes in the debate on EPPR, and may be auseful
clarification as such.
Section four provides a case study from a shiftng cultivation (rice and rubber) based
economy in a lowland rainforest area in Seberida district, Sumatra, Indonesia. First, we
discuss Indonesian customar and statutory law, with a particular focus on the conflct
between these two types oflaw. Next we describe the changes towards individualization
and more secure land rights in the study area, and discuss various secular factors which
may explain this development. More external land claims, population growth, and
higher profitability of rubber have resulted in increased forest clearing and
encroachment in primar forest, and securing of rights through rubber planting.
Section five tries to integrate the discussion of the previous sections, that is to see how
the various elements from the four approaches in section three can be drawn together in
a framework which can the be used to explain the development described in section
four. This framework is mainly rooted within the NIE approach, but also includes the
customary law - statutory law dichotomy in the modeL. It is argued that increased land
value provides the main driving force towards individualization of the rights, and this
force combined with the increase in external claims make farmers increasingly secure
their claims in statutory law.
Section six summarizes the main conclusions of an agricultural household model with
endogenous tenure security. The formal model is presented in the appendix. Tenure
security is deterrnned by the number of external claims, as well as decision made by the
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farmer about intens it y of produetion and enforeement of property rights. An increase in
external claims, which makes the rights more insecure, could result in a strategy of
rubber planting, increased intensification, and increased efforts on enforeement (e.g.,
land certificates). Section seven concludes.
2 Property rights and property rights regimes
"Property rights of individual assets consists of the rights, or the powers, to consume, obtain
income from, and alIenate these assets" (Barzel, 1989: 2).3
The property rights regime is a key institution in an economy. Property rights shape the
incentives of individual resource users, and are therefore critical for economic efficiency
(growth) and environmental conservation. The term "institutions" are in the literature
used both in the meaning of "the rules of the game" as well as for "the teams playing the
game". Following North (1990) we shall use it in the first sense, that is, to use
institutions in the meaning of rules, not organizations. North (1981, chap. 15)
distinguish between institutions at three leveIs:
1. Constitutional rules, or "the rules for making rules".4
2. Operating rules, or institutional arrangements created within the constitutional
rules. The property rights arrangements are key rules here.
3. Moral behavioural codes, alternatively labelled ideology, culture, or cultural
endowments.
Most analyses of property rights change (e.g., Feeny, 1993) take L and 3 as exogenously
given, and study changes in the institutional arangements. This may be justified by the
much higher stabilty of the constitutional and cultural rules, something which also
contributes to the stability of the operating rules. Another justification is simply that in
order to build a theory, some variables must be kept exogenous.
The right to an asset should be understood as a bundle of rights. Three types of property
rights are generally distinguished between in the literature (Barzel, 1989; Eggertsson,
1990: 34):5
1. Use rights: the rights which define the potential uses of land that are legitimate for
an individual, including the right to transform it physically, e.g., through different
agricultural crops and growing techniques.
2. Income rights: the rights to the income, and contract over the terms with other
individuals.
3. Transfer rights: the rights to transfer the asset to another party.
3 Looking at the Chinese symbols for the content of a concept may sometimes be enlightening. The term
"rights" or quanli, introduced into the Chinese language in the mid 19th century, was made up of two
symbols; power (quan) and benefit or profi (li). Thus the term rights was taken to mean the power to
enjoy the benefits from something. Note, however, that the Chinese word for land rights is to be
translated to ownership, where the possibilty to sell and buy land is central.
4 Feeny (1993: 172)
5 Bromley (1989: 187-190), based on earlier work by Honoré, distinguishes between eleven different
categories of rights.
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A property institution consists of a set of rights and a set of duties or obligations.
Statutory rights are never unlirnted, for example, the kind of uses perrntted by the law
is often restricted (e.g., not growing marihuana, or taxation of income). Restrictions of
the rights that shrink the set of permissible uses wil lower the econornc value of the
land.
Property rights wil never be fully delineated because of transaction costs. Transaction
costs can be defined as "the costs associated with the transfer, capture, and protection of
rights" (Barzel, 1989: 2), or "the costs that arise when individuals exchange ownership
rights to econornc assets and enforee their exclusive rights" (Eggertsson, 1990: 14).
One may distinguish between transaction costs related to three different activities (cf.
Eggertsson, 1990: 15):
1. Information: costs associated with the search for information about the price,
quality, and sometimes also quantity of econornc goods.
2. Contracts: costs related to bargaining, making, monitoring and enforcement of
contracts.
3. Enforcement of property rights: costs incurred by the rightholders efforts to protect
the rights.
Unlike conventional econornc analysis which regards such rights as absolute, the
inclusion of transaction costs in the analysis of property rights gives that "rights are
never complete, because people wil never find it worthwhile to gain the entire potential
of "their" assets" (Barzel 1989: 2). According to Barzel, the (security of) rights people
have over an asset is a function of three factors: the rightholder's protection efforts
(costs), other people's capture attempts, and the government protection.
Property arrangements are social relationships among individuals, "they link not merely
a person to an object, but rather a person to an object against other persons" (Bromley,
1989: 202). The key element of this triadic relationship is the right of the owner to
exclude others from the benefits related to the asset (use, income, and transfer rights). In
short, property rights give a person the legal right to exclude others within the limits set
by the law; to what extent these rights are protected is, inter a lia, deterrnned by the
person's own enforcement of the rights. The latter wil, as discussed later, be based on a
ca1culus of the benefits and costs of better protection through his/her own enforeement.
The above is related to another key aspect of property rights, that is, the residual right of
control, or the owner being the residual claimant (Grossman and Hart, 1986). The
residual right of control refers to the right to make any decisions within the restrictions
set by law and contracts with others. The residual claim or return is the net income from
the asset, for example, the land rent (profit) from owning a piece of land. "Tying
together residual returns and residual control is the key to the incentive effect of
ownership" (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 291), because the decision maker (owner)
bears the full consequences of the choices made.
Property rights exist along a number of dimensions, thus any classification represents a
simplification of a complex reality. The most common distinetion is according to the
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econornc agent holding the rights. Based on this, one may distinguish between four
different property rights regimes.6
L. Private property; an individual, a household or a de jure person (e.g., a company)
hold the rights.
2. Common (or communal) property; a group of individuals, for example, a
community, holds the rights. This can be further subdivided into:
2a. Unregulated common property, which only lirnts the access to the resource;
and
2b: Regulated common property, which both lirnts the access, and impose and
enforee rules for resource use.
3. State property; the state holds the property rights, which in some respects could be
regarded as an extended form of 2.
4. Open access; no property rights exist (either de facto or de jure).7
The main distinetion here is between situations with property rights (where the agent
with the rights is either the state, the community, or an individual), and situations where
no one has property rights, I.e., open access.
Whereas these four categories may help c1arify the discussion on property rights
regimes, real life regimes are likely to be a combination of these four. In describing
actual property regimes a number of dimensions should be added:
· Which rights are included? The agent may not have all the three types of rights
lIsted above, and within each of the three types of right the agent may only have
some of all possible rights (for example, only certain uses are allowed). This is the
case under customary land law throughout Indonesia (section four). Related to this
is the fact that the agent may not be well defined; for example, individual
households may use land in a particular way after consultations with the leaders of
the community.
· Land may have different regimes governing different uses; for example,
agricultural use may resemble a private property regime, whereas collection of
fores t products from the same land is governed by a communal management
regime. Certain rights rest with the individual, whereas others rest with the
community and therefore implies certain duties or obligations for the individuals.
· Property rights to land are normally based on either written, statutory law, or
unwritten, customary (traditional) law. It is generally more difficult (costly) to
enforee informal than formal rights through the legal system. Customary rights
may also receive less respect from potential users outside the community, where
the customary law has evolved and can be enforeed, e.g., through socIal sanctions.
Thus, the enforcement costs may be higher for customary rights, whereas the
contraet costs are lower.
6 See, for example, Libecap (1986) and Bromley (1991).
7 Homesteading could also be considered a separate regime, which is particularly relevant in fron tier
areas: land c1earing/preparation gives private property rights to cleared land. Under this regime land is
transferred from an open access resource (regime 4) to a private property resource (regime 1). See
Angelsen (1994; 1996).
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· The security of the rights wil also difter. In the most stylized form (as of ten has
been the practice in conventional economic texts), the three first categories assume
100 percent security for the agent against third party intervention, whereas the open
access case assumes no security. As noted above the security of the rights depends
on a number of factors, inc1uding the owners enforeement efforts, and the
protection given to these rights by the state, and its enforeement ability.
Classification of property regimes is complex because of the number of rights (and
duties) in question, and the fact that different rights are held by different agents.
Typically for some traditional societies (cf. sectionfour), a farmer may have some use
and income rights, but not the right to sell the land to outsiders. The formal ownership
may rest with the vilage, whereas the most valuable rights, that is the use and income
rights, are held by individuals or households. Should such a system be grouped as
communal management or as private property? Too often in the literature it is grouped
as the former, which means that the c1assification is based on just the third type of right
(the transfer right). One could argue that it would be more logical to base the
classification on the most important rights, which in this case rest with the individua1.8
3 Theoretical approaches for explaining the EPPR
"The common reason for the establIshment of private property in land are deduced from the
necessity of offering to individuals sufficient motives for cultivating the ground, and of
preventing the wasteful destruction of immature products of the earth" (Wiliam Foster
Lloyd, 1833).9
The purpose of this section is to provide a critical review of four different approaches to
institutional change in general, and the EPPR hypothesis in particular. The approaehes
and the key element in each of them are:
l. Neo-institutional economics (NIE): Increased land value.
2. Marxian theories: Class struggle.
3. State v. loe al community approaches: Predatory state intervention.
4. Cultural changes: Commoditization of land.
These four approaches are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the purpose of
section five is to integrate the elements of the different approaches that are relevant to
explain the recent development in the study area. The approaches represent, however,
four distinet views on what is the main driving force behind the EPPR, and the
distinetion is useful as such.1O
One common observation is that when transfer rights are given to farmers, they are very rarely used,
that is land markets do frequently not develop when private property rights are introduced (e.g.,
Platteau, 1995). This indicates that the most important rights to the farmers are the use and income
rights.
Quoted in Hardin and Baden (1977).
10 The division into four categories is to some extent based on subjective judgements. Bardhan (1989),
for example, distinguish between the Marxist school, the property rights, transaction costs or
Coase-Demsetz-Alchian- Williamson-North (CDA WN) school, and the imperfect information schooL.
Further, the neo-institutional economics (NIE) school can be divided in several categories, as wil be
discussed below.
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3.1 Neo-institutional economics (N/E): /ncreased land value
Neo-institutional econorncs (NIE) represents an extension of the neo-c1assical
economic research programme to inc1ude institutions in the analysis. Neo-c1assical
econorncs here refers to the methodology of individual rational choice, that is,
individuals act as if the maximize certain objectives subject to certain constraints. The
approach implies methodological individualism, and rational behaviour in the sense of
consistency between actions/behaviour and goals/preferences (ends-means consisteney).
The preferences are assumed to be exogenous (and normally also constant) in the modeL.
The emphasis is on how changes in the constraints (choice set) affect behaviour and
equilibrium outcomes. When we in this paper refer to "conventional neo-classical
econorncs", it is the practice rather than the methodology we have in mind.
NIE is both concerned with how institutions influence behaviour by modifying the
choice set, and how institutions change over time (North, 1986; Eggertsson, 1990:
29-30). In the first set of analysis institutions are exogenous, in the second they are
made endogenous. The more difficult research question, which is also the topic of this
paper, is the latter one. Modellng the evolution of property rights, or institutional
change more generally , is stil among the least developed areas within NIE (Eggertsson,
1990: 248).
Conventional neo-c1assical economic theory has assumed costless exchange and perfeet
information. NIE adds the concept of transaction costs in order to understand and
explain institutions and their change. Or in the words of North (1990: 27): "My theory
of institutions is constructed from a theory of human behaviour combined with a theory
of the costs of transacting. " The rational choice framework for the study of human
behaviour is maintained from neo-classical economics. As such, NIE is but another
extension of a more than a century long neo-c1assical research programre.
NIE is an umbrella for several quite different schools of thought. Bromley (1989, chap.
1) distinguishes between three distinet approaches: (1) The property rights school,
represented by, among others, Coase (1960) and Demsetz (1967); (2) the induced
institutional innovation theory (Ruttan and Hayarn, 1984; Hayarn and Ruttan, 1985);
(3) the North (1981; 1990) approach, which has inspired much of the present paper.
Eggertsson (1990, chap. 8) divides NIE into "the naive model" and "the interest group
theory of property rights", which partly corresponds with Bromley's first and third
category, respectively.
"The naive theory of property rights" refers to some of the earlier attempts in the 1960s
to model and explain the emergency of property rights without inc1uding social and
political institutions in the analysis (Eggertsson, 1990: 250). Demsetz (1967) is the
classical paper on this theory: "Property rights develop to internalize externalities when
the gains of internalization become larger than the costs of internalization. ... the
emergence of new private or state-owned property rights wil be in response to changes
in technology and relative prices". Institutions are forme d and modified in order to
minimize trans action costs. Demsetz and others members of the property rights school
only looked at the individual demand for property rights, and did not inc1ude
coordination (free rider) problems, the role of conflcting interest between groups, or the
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role of the state in supplying institutions. In the tradition following Coase (1960), the
analysis in these early writings was an harmonious and optirnstic one with regard to the
free markets ability to develop efficient institutions, in the sense that socIal welfare
(often equated with econornc growth) is maximized. It also provided an input to a
theoretical justification for the free market economy.
Later work in the NIE tradition, paricularly by Douglass North, has broadened and
extended the analysis to inc1ude these initially overlooked factors. The importanee of the
individual demand for institutional change is maintained in the model, but there may be
a large gap between individual demand for change on the one hand, and the actual
outcome on the other. First, because institutions have important collective good
characteristics, well known problems of free (easy) riding, collective rationality and
group behaviour and become critical. Second, the state, which has a potential role in
sol ving this dilemma, has its own interests. Socially inefficient institutions may be
created or maintained by the rulers because the existing institutions serve their interests.
Third, existing institutions, which are critical in deterrnning both the individual demand
for institutional change as well as in solving collective action problems, may prevent
socially desirable changes. Thus, a society may be caught in a low efficiency
institutional trap. Indeed, very few would stil hold the view that a free or unrestricted
evolution of institutions would ensure economic efficiency. "It is absurd to argue that
proeesses of institutional evolution 'optimize'" (Nelson, 1995: 83).
Ruttan and Hayami (l 984) represent a noteworthy application of the NIE approach to
developing countries, mainly within the property rights schooL. Their "induced
institutional innovation" approach focuses on changes in resource endowments,
technical change, and growth in product demand. These factors shape the demand for
institutional innovation. While they are certainly aware of the importanee of supply of
institutional arrangements, these are not well integrated in their analysis. Feeny (1993)
represents a further extension of this work, and focus more explicitly on the supply
factors within a demand and supply framework of institutional change. We wil return to
this in more details in section five.
The engine of change in NIE is new economic opportunities. "It is the possibility of
profits that cannot be captured within the existing arrangemental structure that leads to
the formation of new (or the mutation of old) institutional arrangements " (Davis and
North, 1971: 39). The sources of this creation of uncaptured profit under existing
arrangements can be due to changes in several parameters (Ruttan and Hayarn; 1984;
Libecap, 1989: 16; North 1981, 1986; Eggertsson, 1990; Feder and Feeny, 1993: 243).
Changes in relative prices is the most common explànation, for example, as a result of
changes in relative resource endowments (inc1uding population growth). Technologies,
both for production and enforcement, are also referred to as a source of change, even
though technological change itself should be endogenous. Some writers also note that
changes in preferences (sometimes inc1uded in the term "ideology") can initiate
institutional changes (see further discussion below).
Related to the EPPR hypothesis, the main proposition by the NIE is that (private)
property rights evolve when an asset becomes more scarce and therefore more valuable,
as reflected in relative prices. When the value increase, competition for the resource wil
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make it worthwhile to spend more resources to create and protect the property rights to
that asset. Problems related to free or easy riding (moral hazard) wil also direct this
specification and securing of rights towards increased privatization.
3.2 Marxian theories: Class struggle
It is difficult to pin down the Marxian model since the interpretations of Marx' work
seem innumerable, partly a reflection of the ambiguity or richness -- depending on your
personal faith -- in Marx' own writings. In discussing Marxism in the context of our
paper, one should remember that Marx wrote about the evolution of private property
rights in feudal Europe, particularly England, and not in the much less class-divided
agrarian societies which are our point of reference. Nevertheless, Marxists have an
established theory of endogenous institutional change, which is worth exarnning.
At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society enter into
contradiction with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression for
the same thing - with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto.
From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetter.
Then begins an epoch of social revolution" (Marx, 1859).11
In other words, changes in the productive forces (means of production and technology)
leads to atension between the existing structure (induding property rights
arrangements) and the productive potential. This tension is solved through dass
struggle, and the result is new institutions.
Except for the notion of class struggle, we see the obvious sirnlarities between the NIE
and the Marxian approaches to institutional change. The idea of dass struggle is,
however, a key one in Marxian theories, and cannot simply be skipped. Further,
Marxists' emphasis is on technology as the primaryengine of change (technological
deterrnnism), whereas the NIE's main focus has been on population growth, but also
other factors, induding technology. This preoccupation with technology as a dOrnnating
force of change, and the subsequent neglect of other factors, is indeed one of the main
points of critique by writers within the NIE, e.g., North (1981: 60-63) and Ruttan and
Hayami (1984: 216-217).
Parts of the Marx inspired analysis on the evolution of private property rights during the
endosure movement in Western Europe from the late Middle Age and onwards focus on
the importanee of class structure and dass power for the different outcomes in different
countries. Brenner (1976: 31) holds that "class structures tend to be highly resilient in
relation to the impact of econornc forces; as a rule, they are not shaped by, or alterable
in terms of, changes in demographie or commercial trends Il .
Others would tend to view dass structure as the outcome rather than the driving force of
the proeess. Enclosures were a precondition for a capitalistie development. First, it gave
rise to landlessness, and then a proletariat in the form of a landless labour force
(Lazonick, 1974). Second, the profit of landowners served as "a primary source of
primitive capital accumulation and forme d a basis for the capitalist mode of production"
(Cohen and Weitzman, 1975: 289). Cohen and Weitzman, which basically is a
Il Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy, quoted in Bardhan (1989: 4).
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formalization of the Marxian arguments on the consequences in terms of increased
inequality of the enclosure movement, do not ascribe the class relations any major role
in initiating the change. Instead their explanation can more appropriately be grouped
under the cultural view as discussed below.
Private property rights seem to emerge in traditional agrarian societies even in cases
where there is no distinet c1ass structure initially. In traditional agrarian societies land is
normally relatively abundant, which means that one of the preconditions for the
conventional landlord-landless or bourgeoisie-proletariat c1ass formation is not in place.
Marx and most of his followers recognized this fact, even though they pointed out the
possibilty of other types of class division. We find it, however, difficult to assign any
central position to c1ass analysis in explaining EPPR in our context.
The usefulness in Marxian analysis in relation to EPPR seems to be in particularly two
areas: First, it gives importantcontributions to the analysis of the consequences of such
a development, not at least on the question of efficiency v. equity (question 3 asked in
the introduction of the paper).12 Second, as pointed to by North (1981: 61), the Marxian
framework "includes all of the elements left out of the neo-classical framework:
institutions, property rights, the state, and ideology". It draws our attention to commonly
overlooked factors in conventional economic analysis. Furthermore, both the state-local
and the cultural approachespresented below have been inspired by Marxian analysis.13
We would, however, argue that the methodology and theoretical framework for studying
these elements are better provided by other approaches than the Marxian. In particular
the NIE seems able to capture several elements of the Marxian analysis, while differing
on certain key aspects: (1) methodological individualism v. the more questionable c1ass
as a the primary unit of analysis and action, and (2) the focus on supply and demand,
and relative prices v. the labour theory of value, which does not seem to have much
explanatory power. Thus, our views are in line with the conc1usion of one of the leading
neo-Marxian economists (Roemer, 1986: 191):
"With respect to method, I think Marxian economics has much to leam form neo-classical
economics. With respect to substantive research, I think it is the other way around, in many
instances. "
3.3 State v. local community approaches: Predatory state intervention
At the core of this approach are several related conflicts: the centre v. the periphery, the
state v. the local community, and statutory v. customary law. Compared with the two
previous positions, this approach is to a much lesser extent a coherent theoretical
framework. This political economy approach is, however, a common explanation of why
a regime of private property is replacing regimes involving some form of communal
management.
12 The Cohen and Weitzman (1975) paper is an example of this, which also shows how Marxian analysis
and neo-classical methodology can be merged.
13 The generous acknowledgement of Marxian theory by Douglass North (1981: chap. 6) should be
noted. Indeed, Bardhan (1989: 13) holds that "North (1981) significantly differs from other members
of the latter gro up of economists (neo-classical institutional economists), and is nearer the position of
Marxists, in assigning a theory of ideology and the state a central place in his theory of history and
institutional change".
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The behaviour of the state should be understood in light of its dual role: the state is both
a social planner (welfare maximizer), and an instrument for powerful groups, or in
Marx' terms "the executive committee of the bourgeoisie". This corresponds to what is
known as the contraet origin v. the predatory origin of the state. Decisions by the state
should be understood in the intersection between these two roles. Conventional
neo-classical economics, often implicitly, assumes the former, whereas Marxists and
writers applying the state-loe al community perspective emphasize the predatory role of
the state. 
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The dichotomy between the developmental and the predatory state can be ilustrated by
a simple model and typology. Let X be total output in the society, and t the proportion of
the output extracted by the state (an indicator of the degree of state intervention). X is a
function of t in an inverted U-shaped relationship; some intervention wil increase X, but
beyond a certain point it lowers X (cf. the Laffer curve). The objective of the state can
generally be formulated as:
Max T=aX(t)+(I-a)tX(t); a,tE (0,1)
t
a = O: the predatory state (maxirnzing own revenue).
a = 1: the developmental state (maximizing overall output).
In the first case the objective of the state is to extract as much as possible out of the
economy, in the second the aim of state intervention is to maxirnze the overall output of
the economy. Most states would have values of abetween zero and one, that is, the state
both tries to serve its own interest and the overall social interests. Obviously, the greater
a is the larger the optimal t. In the social planner case the optimal t wil be when X' = O,
whereas the predatory state solution is given by X' + Xlt = O.
The conflict about the distribution of resources is of ten expressed in tensions between
statutory and customary law. National (statutory) law can be used to extract resources
traditionally held by local communities. We believe this can be auseful approach, for
example, as applied in the case of Indonesia by SKEPHI and Kiddell-Monroe (1993).
The same authors also portray this as a conflct between a Western ideology and a local
one, an approach which in many cases would be incorrect. In pars of Africa the
customary tenure system was actually "invented" and institutionalized by the colonial
rulers (Berry, 1993). Customary rules are ambiguous and subject to ongoing
reinterpretation. Customary claims can be used to mask individual accumulation, and
local elites can insert their own definitions to make them serve their interests (Berry,
1993: 120). As such, both customar and statutory law may be formulated and used to
serve the interests of powerful individuals and groups.
The discussion in the literature on "the vil age against the center" (Bromley and
Chapagain, 1984) is also occupied with resource degradation as a result of misguided
and unsuccessful attempts by the state to replace communal management by a private
property rights regime. Bromley (l 99 1, chap. 6) states that the real tragedy of the
14 Public choice theory, which is neo-c1assical economics applied to politics and as such is within the
neo-c1assical economic theory, does certainly not assurne the state to be aperfect social planner. On
the contrary, it comes c10se to viewing the state as a predator.
11
commons is (1) the breakdown of indigenous property rights structure, and (2) the
failure of the state to replace this with an effective regime with tenure security, which is
necessary -- although not sufficient -- to make econornc actors to inc1ude long-term
effects in their decision-making. The combination of these two factors may result in a de
facto open access regime, even though it is de jure private or state property. The
institutional vacuum makes the environment more susceptible to overexploitation.
The state-local dichotomy could also explain changes in local property regimes. Using
examples from India, Nepal, Indonesia, Nigeria and other countries, Bromley (1991,
chap. 6) argues for the existence of a general disrespect of local management systems by
the state, and the introduction of private property rights as a vehicle for wealth
appropriation by powerful groups controllng the state.
This argument is challenged by Ault and Rutman (1979). They argue, in line with the
property rights school, that individualized ownership is a natural evolution as land
becomes more scarce. However, after independence the new governments in Africa
viewed individual property system as a colonial heritage, and wanted to maintain or
even reinstall communal tenure regimes. Even though indigenous systems were
reasonable efficient under the conditions under which they evolved, the governments'
attempts to preserve these systems prevented a natural evolution towards more
individual rights. The result, Ault and Rutman argue, is an inappropriate property
regime with tenure insecurity, with subsequent productivity and environmental losses.
"Failure to recognise the relationship between land availabilty and individual property
rights within the land tenure system has led to the creation of land tenure systems in the
postindependence period that do not present incentives for the optimal use and development
of agriculturalland" (page 179).
The differing views of Bromley and Ault and Rutman can be seen in the light of the two
above perspectives on the state. Bromley and others emphazise the predatory role of the
state. In the Ault and Rutman description, the policy by African leaders was, at least in
part, based on a social planners view. The intentions where good, but the outcome bad.
Such unintended consequences could be attributed to lack of knowledge, or ideological
blindness.
These two works ilustrate the need to look at the state from both its potential predatory
and contractarian roles, and within these two also consider misguided or misinformed
policies which yield consequences contrary to their intentions. The state is normally
playing both roles at the same time: the Indonesian government is creating plantations
and issuing logging concessions to powerful individuals, which may conflict with local
and environmental interests. At the same time, protection forests and national reserves
are established, and large programres for rural poverty alleviation and improving local
infrastrueture and services are implemented. Ignoring this dualism, and focus on only
one of the roles played by the state, would lirnt the understanding of state behaviour.
To summarize, within the state-local perspective a driving force is a state in the hands of
the national elite, ignoring customary and community based tenure rights to serve their
interests. The state only recognises the statutory law, which is based on private proper ty
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rights. This forces local farmers to obtain formal rights based on statutory law in order
to protect their land against external claimants.
3.4 Cultural changes: Commoditization of land
The rational choice model underlying the NIE has as one of its key assumptions that the
preferences are constant, or at least exogenous. This is one of the limitations of the
model if one wants to study economic change, particularly over a longer period of time.
Conventional neo-classical econorncs seeks to explain changes in behaviour by changes
in the choice set, in particular relative prices, rather than changes in preferences, a case
forcefully argued by Stigler and Becker (1977). Others, including economists such as
North (1981, chap. 3), argue that this is insufficient to explain change.
Preferences are related to culture. There is no generally accepted definition of culture,
and the term is used in a number of ways depending on the topic discussed. Of ten, the
concept is taken to be so wide that it is difficult to handle analytically. A delineation is
therefore necessar. In the institutional literature it often refers to informal rules or
moral codes of behaviour. On the other hand, the concept of preferences in the rational
choice modeloverlaps with "culture" as used in social anthropological literature.
Culture both used in the sense of informal rules and of preferences has a bearing on the
EPPR hypothesis. First, several authors attribute the evolution of private property rights
to changes in the perceptions or preferences related to land. In the discussion of the
enclosure movement in England, Cohen and Weitzman (1975: 321) hold that the main
force was a "fundamental change in attitudes and ideas" or more specifically "an urge to
maxirnze profits from the land". This change is attributed to many factors:
"There is some consensus that the relative increase in internal stabilty (even if only
temporary) caused by the rise of a centralIzed authority, the lon g term influence of trade
expansion, innovations in miltary technology, secularization of relIgious doctrine, the
growth of new opportunities and new consumption desires, each in some fashion supported
the development of a profit -oriented society."
During the enc10sure movement land (and labour) emerged as economic commodities.
Land became a source of individual income rather than a means for obtaining prestige
and power and something to be used for the common benefits. Ellen (1993: 131)
describes a similar development in Seram, Indonesia:
"-cBy the early 1970s:; land -cwas:; becoming a truly exchangeable commodity. ...
individualIsm with respect to land is the cumulative ideological product of structural shifts
resulting from resettlement, confrontation, and participation in a new pOlItical and economIc
order. "
Both in a historical context and to describe changes in traditional agrarian societies in
developing countries today one could describe this phenomenon as a commoditization of
land.
Changes in preferences can create the demand for individualized and more secure
property rights. Alternatively, this cultural change can be viewed as a change in informal
rules which make it more acceptable for members of the community to take more
individual control of the land. This points to the problems of a c1ear distinetion within
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the rational choice model between preferences and informal constraints. As Elster
(1979; 1983) argues forcefully, men are sometimes free to choose their own constraints
(Ulysses and the Sirens), and conversely, preferences may be shaped by the constraints
(Sour Grapes).
This issue also reflects a long standing debate in social sciences: are preferences and
moral behavioural codes the reflection of economic forces, or do they have a li fe on
their own? Popular debates sometimes tend to view culture as a constraint to rational
behaviour, as reflected in the "maximizing man" v. the "social man" debate. Peters
(1993: 1072) considers this to be a false dichotomy; "interests and opportunities are
always culturally coded". North (1977), taking issue with the work of Karl Polanyi
(1944) on non-economic transactional modes, argues that these modes can be
understood within a rational choice framework with trans action costs. Thus, culture (or
at least parts of it) becomes an expression of economic rationality.
Summarizing, the introduction of "culture" challenges NIE's rational choice framework
at three leveIs:
1. It wil modify the choice set (constraints) by including the socIal cost when
informal rules are violated, for example, in the form of socIal sanctions for free
riding.
2. It can also be analyzed as a change in preferences whereby, for example, more
emphasis is put on (individual) consumption of commodities. Another example
would be changes in the ex tent of which the well being of other members of the
community is included in to your own utility function (altruism in the Becker
sense).
3. It may cha11enge the idea of rational choice as an approximation to actual
behaviour. The alternative may, for example, be a theory of behaviour guided by
norms, customs, search for identity and belonging to a group (see Peters, 1993).
A critical question here is to what extent this critique can be incorporated in the rational
choice framework by modifying the preferences and the constraints. We suggest that one
can go further than most of those criticising NIE seem to think, and that rational choice,
as a conceptual model, is more flexible than commonly thought of. The anthropological
critique (point 3 above) is not necessarily in conflct with the rational choice approach,
which main idea is ends-means consistency. Itshould rather be interpreted as a critique
against the narrow set of objectives (and constraints) normally included in econornc
models.
The NIE tries to incorporate the first two points, but there are some problems involved.
Social costs are easy to integrate in conceptual models, but difficult to quantify. Related
to the second point, changes in preferences could be treated as an exogenous change,
even though there is some resistance against resorting to this kind of explanation. One
of Nobel Laureate Gar Becker's three cardinal principles is that "'changes in taste' is the
economists admission of defeat" (Fuchs, 1994: 184).
Moreover, a complete theory of institutional change requires a theory of ideology,
inc1uding endogenous changes in preferences (North, 1981; 1990). No coherent theory
is yet at hand, to a large extent a reflection of the complexity of the issue. Ruttan (1989)
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notes that also the earl y development econornsts stressed that "culture matters Il .
Scholars and practitioners of development are, however, stil dealing with "cultural
endowments at an intuitive level rather than in analytical terms" (p age 1385).
Summarizing this approach, the main focus is on changes in the perceptions of land:
land is increasingly regarded as a econornc commodity, which can be used by
individuals to extract as much surplus as possible. The initiation of such a development
can be due to several factors; many writers emphazise the effect on the loe al economy of
the integration into a larger national (or even global) economy. Related to this is the
Marxian inspired explanation: when money is introduced and a monetarized economy
replaces a traditional subsistence and barter economy, we have the seed of capitalism
and the creation and stimulation of a profit motive guiding econornc behaviour ("money
as the seed of greed"). An anthropological elaboration of this view is given by Kopytoff
(1986: 72):
"One perceives in this a drive inherent in every exchange system towards optimum
commoditization - the drive to extend the fundamentally seductive idea of exchange to as
many items as the existing exchange technology wil comfortably allow. Hence the universal
acceptance of money whenever it has been introduced into non-monetized societies and its
inexorable conquest of the internal economy of these societies, regardless of initial rejection
and of individual unhappiness about it."
A change in preferences wil normally be accompanied by a weakening of informal rules
which would constrain exploitive behaviour, or by the sanctions necessary to enforce
such rules. More open communities, increased mobility, etc. could contribute to a
weakening of social enforcement mechanisms.
The foUT approaehes outlined below are not separate boxes of analysis -- they can indeed
be quite overlapping. Each of them focus, however, on certain main forces behind the
change in the property rights institutions, as summarized in Table 1.
Theory/approach Main driving force behind EPPR
Neo-institutional Relative prices, reflecting resource
econorncs (NIE) scarcity; higher land value.
Marxian c1ass analysis Technology, with subsequent class
struggle.
State-periphery Predatory state intervention, disrespect of
approaehes customar law by the state.
Cultural or ideological Views/attitudes towards land;
explanations commoditization of land.
Table l. Summa ry of diferent approaehes to the emerging private property rights
(EPPR).
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4 Empirical evidence from Indonesia
"Land and water, and the natural resources contained therein, shall be controlled by the state
and used for the maximum benefit of the people" (The Indonesian constitution of i 945).15
Much of the debate on land rights in Indonesia centres around the tension between
customary and statutory land rights, i.e., within the third perspective presented in section
3. This section presents a discussion of customarý (adat) law, followed by a brief
description and discussion of the statutory law and its practice in relation to land use.
The third part gives a description of (recent changes in) the study area of Seberida,
Sumatra.
4.1 Customary (adat) land rightsl6
Customary (adat) law obviously varies throughout Indonesia, and some 16 broad forms
of adat law have been identified (SKEPHI and Kiddell-Monroe, 1993: 232). There is,
however, also a great degree of similarity, which indeed also would resemble traditional
tenure regimes found in other agrarian societies in the developing world (among the best
discussions of this is still Boserup, 1965). The adat (literally custom or tradition) in
Indonesia covers a number of other aspects of human life and interaction than just land
use and tenure. We shall use it here in the meaning of the set of informal, customary
rules that regulate the rights (access and perrnssible uses) to land and forest among
members of the local community.
Land is under adat law regarded as the property of the community, in the sense that the
transfer right belongs to the community. Communal land cannot be bought, sold or
leased. This right is known as hak ulayat (literally area rights). When it comes to the use
and income rights two general patterns are present, and was also observed in our study
district of Seberida.
1. Common use and income rights: This wil typically cover the collection of many
forest products, where every member of the community is free to collect from the
forest under hak ulayat.
2. Individual (household) usufructuary rights: The individual use and income rights
apply in particular to two areas. First, fores t may be c1eared and used for swidden
cultivation by the household, and the household has the right to the income derived
from agricultural produetion. Second, for some valuable. forest products, where
demarcation is possible, individuals may get rights to harvest these. This was the
case in Seberida for, among others, honey trees and wild growing rubber
(jelutung).
Of particular interest is the rights related to swidden cultivation. Income and use rights
are acquired by clearance of forest and working on the land. Thus the output from
swidden rests with the person or household who works on the swidden. There is a
widespread "myth ... that swidden agriculturists own their own land communally (or not
at all), work it communally, and consume it yields communally" (Dove, 1983: 85).
15 Article 33 (1), quoted in SKEPHI and Kiddell-Monroe (1993: 236)
16 Besides my own fieldwork, this section draws on particularly Dove (1983), SKEPHI and
Kiddell-Monroe (1993), and 0stergaard (1994).
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In Seberida the household or line age who cleared the forest initially has a priority right
for later cultivation. This is a widespread way of acquiring rights: "Throughout
Southeast Asia, rights to secondary forest are usually held by specific, individual
households; these rights being initially acquired by virtue of opening of the primary
forest on that land, and then extending to the secondary reforestation which follows each
subsequent cropping there" (Dove, 1983: 86-87). Moreover, anthropologists have for
long recognized that in traditional societies people commonly have "possessive rights"
(Basu, 1995: 21); whoever first gets to possess an asset has the right to it.
A number of modifications of this "first come first served" rule exist in adat system in
Seberida. A rightholder cannot refuse others to open swidden on "her" land, provided
she is not going to use it in the near future. The person borrowing the land can normally
only plant rice and other annual crops, not any perennials. Further, the strength of rights
a person has to the land depends on how many times the land has been reopened, the
number of years since it was opened last time, as well as the distance from the vilage,
partly because aremote location of the field makes enforeement more costly. The adat
law is therefore ambiguous, and open to interpretations and local adaptations. Indeed,
one could find marked differences within the Seberida district.
Planting of rubber or other perennials would extend the usufructury rights a person has
over land, and "in practice such usufruct amounts more or less to a permanent right to
the land" (0stergaard, 1994: 76). Planting of perennials is therefore the most efficient
way to get more permanent individual rights to land within the adat system.
What would be the appropriate classification of the adat land tenure system, taking up
the discussion from section 2? Dove (1983: 88), with reference to a similar shifting
cultivation system in Kalimantan, hol ds that "it is clearly rnsleading to label such
systems of land use as 'communal"'. First, there is a large variation in households' access
to land though rights accumulated over time. Second, as is c1early seen in Seberida, the
most important of the property rights -- that is use and income rights to land for
agricultural purposes as well as to some of the most valuable forest products -- are
individualized. This makes it important to distinguish between common property and
community based rules of mainly individual property rights, I.e., the most important of
these -- the use and income rights.
4.2 Statutory law and practice related to land use in Indonesia!?
The Agrarian Act of 1870 passed by the Dutch colonial government gave full protection
to the farmers of land kept under constant cultivation. Fallow land used under the
shifting cultivation system was grouped as "virgin or waste land", and designated as
state dornnions. Thus there was no protection given to traditional rights under the
shifting cultivation system. is
17 This section is based on Dove (1987) and SKEPHI and Kiddell-Monroe (1993).
18 The use of "waste" land and the provisions given by this law spurred a development of private
cash-crop estates. Traditional swiddening was exc1uded rather than inc1uded in the new economy. This
dualIsm is still very present in prov inc es like Riau and Jambi in Sumatra.
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The Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 aimed at "the abolition of Western-adat dualism by
bas ing agrarian law on adat land law" (SKEPHI and Kiddell-Monroe, 1993: 236). The
law states that:
"The agrarian law over the earth, water, and space is a hukum adat (traditionallaw) so long
as it stil exists and does not hamper the national and state needs.,,19
Even though the Basic Agrarian Law recognizes the traditional law, the reservation
made that it should be in accord with national interests, and that it cannot conflct with
any higher laws and regulations (article 3) has preserved the dualism and ambiguity it
intended to remove.
Furthermore, the law distinguishes between two types of land rights: the customary
rights of avail (hak ulayat) and rights of ownership (hak milik). Even though the law
states that also customary rights must be recognized except when in conflct with
national interests, in practice, the burden of proof is reversed:
"All development officials know the wording of this article by heart, and they take it to
mean n and they in fact employ it as meaning -- that whenever and wherever rights of avail
conflct with their projects, these rights can automatically be ignored or overridden. This
faIlure to either prove or contest these claims of national interest obviously raises the
possibilty that such claims are sometimes used to override rights of avail for purposes other
than the national interest or even contrary to national interest" (Dove, 1987: 266)
Sometimes traditional rights are dismissed on the basis of bein g undocumented,
ignoring the fact that documentary pro of is irrelevant in traditional law (SKEPHI and
Kiddell-Monroe, 1993: 237). Further, the 1960 law states that:
"every person and every corporate body having a certain right on agricultural land is in
principle oblIged to cultivate or to exploit it actively by himself while avoiding extortionate
methods".20
This opens up for charging traditional swidden practices with violations of the law,
based on both the burning of forest (extortionate) and the long fallow periods (not active
exploitation).
A final area which opens up for vested interests in the practice of the law is the
distinetion between hak ulayat and hak milk, where the farmers rights to land c1assified
under the former wil be very weak in any conflct with the state. By c1assifying land
rights as rights of avail it may be appropriated by the state without compensation.
The Basic Act of Forestry of 1967 states that all forest is to be considered state property,
and traditional rights should not interfere with forestry operations. Compared to the
agrarian law, this law represents a de jure weakening of the adat rights, and is as such
more in line with actual practice. A Forestry Agreement of 1975 mandates that logging
companies "observe the rights of local people, for example to trees and products".21 In
practice, however, this agreement has had little effect, inc1uding in our study area in
Seberida.
19 Article 5, quoted in SKEPHI and Kiddell-Monroe (1993: 236)
20 Article 10, quoted in SKEPHI and Kiddell-Monroe (1993: 237)
21 SKEPHI and Kiddell-Monroe (1993: 240).
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Another area of relevanee is the strong emphasis on centralization (often justified by
"national unit y") in Indonesian law and polities. Of particular relevanee is the Act no. 5
of 1979 on vilage adrnnistration.22 Until 1979 vilage administration on the outer
islands of Indonesia (all islands except Java and Bali) was mainly based on adat law.
While both the Agrarian and Forestry laws made some recognition of traditional rights,
"the 1979 Vilage Government Act formally removed this potent link between
individual and communal resource management based on traditional law and a vil age
level political entity also based on such law" (Sandbukt, 1995: 62). This was replaced by
a Javanese inspired, national model of vilage adrnnistration.
According to this Act a vil age headman (kepala desa) is elected by his constituents for
a period of eight years, but the election has to be confirmed -- and may be disrnssed --
by the district head. A vilage council (LMD) is not an elected body, but consisting of
prominent community members and sub-vilage leaders, appointed by the vilage
headman. Neither the LMD or the Vilage Development Organization (LKMD) are
generally functioning well, and attraet littIe interest, partly because of their
unrepresentative nature and lack of rooting in traditional law. Thus, a potentially viable
loe al resource management system based on traditional law has been replaced by a more
or less non-functioning centrally imposed vilage administration.
In conclusion, statutory law recognises traditional adat rights, but its ambiguity and the
priority given to national interests in the day-to-day interpretation of the law have made
this recognition of lirnted value to the farmers in any conflct with external c1aimants.
Furthermore, the recognition of such rights in statutory law has been weakened over
time since Independence in 1945. The various rights related to different types of land
us es under the customary and statutory laws are summarized in Table 2.
22 The following on the Vilage Administration Act draws on Sandbukt (1995).
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Land use Customary (adat) law (i.e., rights in relation to National
(increasing other members of community) (statutory) law
intens it y ) (i.e., security of
Use and income rights Transfer rights
rights in
relation to
Agricultural Collection of external
production forest products claims)
Primary forest All members of All members of Vested with the State forest
community free the community community
to open fores t has rights,
for swidden and except for some
plant perennials individually
Long fallow Rights belong to marked Defined as
forest the initial products (trees) waste land, and
clearer of under state
primar forest; domains
Short fallow others may More secure
forest temporary use it rights than
for swiddening above, but stil
very weak
Traditional Belong to the As above, but Unc1ear, may be Some, but still
rubbe r gardens farnly that less relevant used as small chances
planted rubber collateral and for
transferred compensation if
land
expropriated.
Intensive rubbe r Relatively good,
gardens particularly if
planted under
an
intensification
programre
Table 2: Overview of land rights according to customary (ada t) and statutory law.
4.3 Recent changes in Seberida district, Sumatra
The case study draws on fieldwork conducted in 1991-1992 in the district (kecamatan)
of Seberida in the regency (kabupaten) Indragiri Hulu in Riau province, Sumatra,
Indonesia. I have discussed the shiftng cultivation economy and the recent changes at
some length in Angelsen (1995a; 1995b), and intend only to give a very brief summary
here. Seberida is 2 800 km2 in extent. A hil massif in the south, the Tigapuluh Hils,
consists mainly of primary forest, even though large are as have been logged. The north
and east parts are covered by flat, swampy land, whereas the western part is dornnated
by the low undulating country of the Cinaku valley. The natural vegetation consists of
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lowland rain forest and swamp forest. Along the roads and rivers, the vegetation is a
mosaie of secondary forest, swiddens, and traditional rubber forests.
Traditional subsistence has been based on shifting cultivation and collection of forest
products, but during this century forest collecting has increasingly been replaced by
swidden-based rubber planting. Permanent cultivation is found in the transmigration
settlements (Government sponsored migrants from Java and Bali) along the Cinaku
valley. The population density has been relatively stable throughout most of this
century . The censuses of 1930 and 1961 showa density of slightly above 3 persons/km2,
the ratio increasing to 4 in 1980, and 5.5 in 1991, which is still not very high (14.3
including the transmigration settlements).23 There are at present more than 41 500
inhabitants in Seberida. An extremely high annual population growth rate of 13.1
percent during the 1980s was mainly due to a massive inflow of transmigrants, which
now comprise more than 60 percent of the total population.
Most of the shifting cultivation practice (padi ladang) in Seberida can be defined as a
bush-fallow system (fallow period from 5 to 10 years), but also with a significant share
of forest-fallow (fallow length of more than 10 years, see Rutenberg, 1980). This
demonstrates that the shifting cultivation system in Seberida is at a relatively early stage
in its evolution, implying that the "degradation syndrome" (soil and nutrient mining
through short fallow periods) has not yet occurred. 7 out of L O households cleared forest
for swidden cultivation at least one of the last two years (1990-1991). The average rice
output per swidden is very low, only around 480 kg per swidden or 400 kg per ha in
1991 (average swidden size is 1.2 ha), and with huge variations (high yield risk), which
is only about one fifth of the national average for dryland rice. Thïs is sufficient for only
4-5 months consumption on average. The low yield is a reflection of the poor soil
quality (acidity) in the area, as well as problems related to pests, particularly wild boar
(forest pig).
8 out of 10 households have rubber gardens (Hevea brasiliensis), more than 97 percent
being planted with traditional, low yielding trees (karet rakyat). The number having
mature rubber gardens that can be tapped is much lower, reflecting a sharp increase in
rubber planting from the mid-1980s. In addition 11 percent had immature, high yielding
rubber planted through the World Bank and Government funded Smallholder Rubber
Development Programre (SRDP). The area of rubber holdings by the non-transrngrant
population is about 12000 ha, which is about a quarter of the secondary forest and 4.3
percent of the total area of these vilages. The average annual income from one ha of
tappable rubber garden (Rp 340 000 or USD 170) exceeds the income from the annual
crops (mainly rice) planted on the first year on the swidden (Rp 250 000). Moreover,
traditional rubber can be tapped continuously for 30-40 years after an initial maturation
period of 10- 12 years, whereas rice presently is harvested in only one out of about every
mne years.
Whereas some of the basic features of the swidden-rubber system have been more or
less constant over several decades, since the early 1980s there has been a number of
significant changes in the exogenous environment of the shifting cultivators:
23 See 0stergaard (1994) for a discussion of the history of the district.
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l. Increased land claims from external users, mainly government sponsored projects
in the form of logging; transmigration, where partly fallow forest and rubber
gardens were appropriated to the transrngration development; and plantations (oil
palm), which is of more recent date, but may become the most important external
land c1aim in the future.
2. Changes in relative prices, in particular due to improved infrastrueture (roads) and
market access following the logging and transmigration projects. Better market
access means higher prices for cash crops, whereas consumption commodities
become cheaper. Thus, it wil be more profitable, ceteris paribus, to move from
produetion for household consumption toward cash crops and more specialized
produetion. Moreover, world market rubber prices increased steadily from L 985 to
mid 1988, after which they levelled off and stabilized at the 1985-86 level
3. Dec1ining profitability of non-timber forest products, as a result of
overexploitation, and lower farm gate price of the main product -- rattan.
4. Population growth. The population in the 20 traditional (non-transrngrant) vilages
grew from 11413 in 1980 to 15406 in 1991; an annual growth rate of 2.8 percent.
5. "Commercialization" of vilage life. As part of a general national drive for
development in then conventional sense, increasing emphasis is being put on
individual consumption, which creates increased "needs" for cash. In
microeconornc terms, this suggests that preferences have changed in favour of
income and consumption relative to leisure.
6. Changes in the vilage adrnnistration, as discussed above.
These changes can be summarized as augmented land rent (or land value) due to intern al
and external land claims, higher rubber price, and lower transport or travel costs. The
opportunity co st of labour has also decreased, because of the declining profitabilty of
forest produce, and population growth not absorbed in the off-farm economy. Further, as
a result of both internal and external factors, the customary land tenure system has
eroded.
The changes described above have resulted in significant modifications in the shifting
cultivators' adaptations. There has been a transition from a relatively stable rice based
shifting cultivation system to a smallholder rubber system which encroaehes on
previously unused old-growth forest. The most significant changes over the period
L 985- L 99 1, which the household survey covered, are:
1. Increasing share of households opening swidden. About 42 percent of the
households opened swidden in 1985; this share increased to 61 percent in 1991.
2. Increased rubber planting. During 1985-1986 about one third of the swiddens
were planted with rubber. This has increased steadily to more than 90 percent in
1991.
3. Increased primary forest clearance. The share of primary forest c1earance has
almost double d from 7 percent in 1989 to 13 percent in 1991. Data about the
farmers plans for 1992 confirm the trend of increased clearing of primary forest.
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Total forest area cleared by shifting cultvators from about 1 400 ha in 1985 to 2 400 ha
in 1991, whereas the annual primary forest clearing has increased from 160 to 420 ha
over the same time period?4
The sharp increase in the share of households engaged in shifting cultivation, in forest
clearing, and in rubber planting could be viewed and explained from at least three
perspectives, as elaborated in Angelsen (1995a). First, it can be viewed as a rational
response to increased profitability of rubber, following a conventional economic logic.
Second, increased land scarcity is generally seen as a major driving force for agricultural
intensification (Boserup, 1965; Ruthenberg, 1980). Whereas both these approaehes are
useful to understand the changes in Seberida, this paper wil concentrate on a third
perspective which view the switch to rubber and increased land clearance as a strategy
for obtaining and securing land rights. The next section develops a conceptual model
based on the theories in section three to explain and understand the changes just
described.
5 Discussion and an integrated framework
"The supply of institutional change is important; trends in the demand, although necessary,
are not sufficient for understanding the path of change. Elements of pOlItical economy
analysis are crucial; the political and economic costs and benefits to the rulIng elItes are a
key to explain the nature and scope of change" (Feeny, 1993: 168).
The development in the study area can be summarized as increased land scarcity
(implying higher land value or land rent), partly because of an increase in the number of
external claims to what is considered community land according to customary law (hak
ulayat). This development is not unique to the Seberida distriet, in fact, the forces of
change and the subsequent response by local farmers are common throughout Southeast
Asia.
From a property rights perspective, the response by the farmers has been twofold:
1. A strengthening of the individual usufructuary rights to land under the adat law
through rubber planting and expansion of the swidden cultivation area (opening of
land which no one previously has claims to). This development represents a
strengthening of the individual use and income rights relative to the common rights
(cf. Table 2. When land is used intensively the usufructuary rights evolve into
more permanent rights under the customary law.
2. The individual rights are increasingly, though still on a relatively small scale,
formalized by acquiring protection in statutory law, i.e., through obtaining land
certificates. In addition to use and income rights, this also gives the person transfer
rights.
A general increase in land scarcity combined with the high profitability of rubber, have
increased the benefits from securing the rights to a particular piece of land. Moreover,
because rubber itself gives usufructuary rights to land, there is no extra co st of
establishing and strengthening the customar rights to the land. The lirntation of such
24 As discussed in some detail in Angelsen (1995a), these figures should not be taken as a measure of
deforestation.
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rights is, as discussed above, that adat mainly gives protection against claims from
members of the community, whereas it is of lirnted value in conflcts with external
claimants.25
Statutory law and title deeds provide better protection against external c1aims, but
depends also on a number of other factors. Rubber planting increases the possibilities
for the land being accepted as the proper ty of the planter in a possible conflct with the
state or with private companies, for example, if plantations are established and the
question of compensation arise. This would be the case even without a formal title.
Higher intensity of production, for example, planting of high yielding rubber varieties,
high density of rubber trees, and a well maintained rubber garden also enhance the
tenure security.
Formal land titles can be obtained at various leveIs, generally with increasing security
and higher costs the higher the level of authority issuing the title; vilage (desa), district
(kecamatan), regency (kabupaten), and nationalleveL. So far the farmers in Seberida
have not been rushing for formal registration of the land which they have rights to
according to adat law. Yet, the vilage headmen have encouraged formal land titling,
which over time wil underrnne the customary law.
Why this reluctance to obtain titles? The main answer lies in the high costs involved. A
certificate would be very expensive for the average farmer, when both offcial and
unofficial dues have to be paid. The area a household has rights to according to
customary law could well be 10 - 15 hectare (ha), and the costs of titling all land would
be well beyond the reach of most farmers. Deeds provided by the National Land Agency
(BPN) at the district and provincial leve! are lImited to two ha per person. Larger
properties must be approved by the Jakarta office, with the extra expenses involved
(Sandbukt, 1995: 57). Thus, title deeds are mainly relevant for the most intensively
cultivated land. Plots planted with high yielding robber under the Smallholder Rubber
Development Programme (SRDP) get titled, and is -- if well tended -- regarded as
secure property. Another kind of costs of land titling is related to the fact that people
would con sider this to be in conflct with, or at least not recognised by the adat law.
Even though formal land registration has been lirnted so far, we believe this wil be
more frequent in the future for several reasons. First, the external c1aims may continue
increasing, making the securing of rights in statutory law more important. As elaborated
in Angelsen (1995a), farmers' expectations about future external claims and land
scarcity is the important factor here. The household survey showed that most farmers
expect increasing difficulties to fin d land for swidden cultivation. Second, as shown
formally in section six, increased intensification would make it more attractive to also
secure the land through titlng. Third, some of the initial hesitation because it represents
a break with the adat law may be weakened over time. A documentation of the latter
from Lampung, Sumatra is found in Michon et al. (1995): a traditional prohibition of
25 It is not only in conflcts with the state that local users may lose, but also against potential users from
outside the community. Michon et aL. (1995: 5) discuss such a case from Lampung Sumatra, where
"communal control did not appear able to protect the interest of legitimate owners against external
unauthorized tappers c:of resins::".
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planting perennials was removed, and individual appropriation of land through planting
of profitable resins became acceptable also according to customary law.
Returning to the four approaches outlined in section three, which one are the most
useful or have the most explanatory power to explain the development? A definite test
would obviously be impossible to undertake; rather "the ability to tell a consistent story
is an important test of the analytical framework" (Feeny, 1993: 174). We would argue
that neo-institutional econorncs (NIE) provides the most consistent framework, which
at the same time is sufficiently flexible to inc1ude elements from the other approaches.
In particular, the state - local dichotomy, and the related tension between customary and
statutory law should be incorporated in the analysis.
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Figure 1: Main forces de te rmin ing changes in the property rights regime. 
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Figure 1 sketches a conceptual framework which can explain the changes in the property
rights regime. We apply a "demand and supply for institutional change" metaphor,
which should not be taken too literally or stretched toa far (Feeny, 1993: 198).27 It may,
however, be useful to think of the demand (left side in the figure ) as representing the
resource users' benefits from different institutional arrangements. The benefits would be
a function of, inter alia, the protection given against external c1aims. The supply (right
side in the figure) is given in terms of the costs of providing various degrees and types
of protection against third party interference.
26 One could, obviously, add more elements and arrows to the figure. We have limited to the mai n
variables and the main connections. A framework which relates everything to everything, as done in
Ruttan and Hayami (1984), is not very helpful to understand the main mechanisms at work.
27 The market analogy is far from perfeet: there is no c1ear commodity, nor a single price, as in a market.
The metaphor applies to a variety of market structures, with of ten discrete and multidimensional
goods. See Lin and Nugent (1995) for a broad based discussion of demand and supply of institutions
and institutional change.
25
The main strength of NIE is on the demand side of the figure. The key variable here is
land scarcity, which wil be reflected in the land rent or land value. A number of factors
can contribute to increased land scarcity. In the Seberida district higher rubber prices,
population growth, and external land c1aims have been the most important. In addition
to total land scarcity, the composition of land demand between intern al (within the
community) and external claimants is important for the demand for institutional change.
Higher land value creates a demand for institutional change. First, as a simple but
important fact, when land rent increases, higher transaction costs can be incurred while
stil retaining a positive profit. Second, higher land value goes in tandem with more
investments in land.28 However, farmers are only able to pick the fruits, sometimes
literally , of their investments if the tenure is secure. Thus, the increased potential value
of land could only be captured by the individual farmers by securing their land rights.
On the supply side, we distinguish between two sets of institutions which can provide
tenure security: statutory and customary law. These are examples of (1) institutions
provided from above by the state, and (2) institutions provided from below by collective
action by a group of individuals. Within these laws, there are various degrees of
protection against third party intervention. Generally, increased protection can only be
obtained by incurring higher trans action costs (contract and enforcement costs), but this
need not always be the case: the Seberida case study provides an example where the
most profitable crop alternative (rubber) is also the one which gives highest tenure
security.
The state has two roles, according to the framework of Figure 1. First, government
sponsored projects such as transmigration, logging, plantation, mining, etc. have been
the main source of external land claims. Second, the state has a role to play as a supplier
of formal rules and legal protection of property rights through the laws and acts which
regulate land use, and the enforcement of these. As discussed in section 4.2, there are
interactions between these two sets of institutions. First, the statutory law recognises the
customary law formally, although not much in practice. Second, some variables, such as
intensity of produetion, affect the tenure security under both systems.
A final element inc1uded in the figure is the cultural endowments (Ruttan and Hayami,
1984), or normative behavioural rules or moral behavioural codes (North, 1981). These
are important for the stabilty of the system. As discussed in section 3.4, their influence
within our framework would be twofold. Cultural endowments have an impact on the
demand for institutional change: changing norms towards regarding land as an economic
commodity, or changes in preference towards material consumption can strengthen the
pressure on land, and thereby the demand for change in the property rights regime.
Second, the moral behavioural codes are important in shaping the customary land law,
and its practice and efficiency.
The cultural endowments are more fundamental institutions, but would also change over
time, even though at a slower pace. They would be influenced by, inter alia, the actual
28 For example, in a subsistence economy higher population density leads to less land per family and
higher land value. In order to produee sufficient for the family's consumption, the inputs and
investments in land mus t increase.
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property rights regime (operating rules, or secondary institutional arrangements). This
proeess is put clearly by North and Thomas (1971: 786):
"The forces of change ... wil first induce pressure to change contractual forms - that is to
alter secondary institutional arrangements. The cumulative forces of such changes which
violate, modify, or otherwise bypass existing fundamental institutional arrangements wil
induce growing pressure for more basic - and more costly - modifications in primary
institutional arrangements."
The modifications in the property rights regime would take place in the interplay
between the demand and supply factors. In simple terms, the increased land value
creates a demand for higher tenure security. The supply side gives a menu of varying
degrees of protection, generally with higher costs the higher the protection is.
Increased land scarcity provides the main driving force towards individualization of the
property rights. The increase in external c1aims (which relates to the composition of the
increased demand) strengthen this tendency, and also makes farmers increasingly secure
their rights in statutory law. Thus the evolution of private property rights is reflected in
both the fact that within the customary land tenure system individual rights are
strengthened relative to rights held in common, and by an increased reliance on statutory
law -- which only recognize individual rights -- relative to the customary law.
Does increased land scarcity lead to a move from informal to formal property rights
institutions, from customary to statutory law? The answer depends critically on the
amount of external claims, and to what extent there exist effective local management
institutions which give protection against c1aimants. The latter is a key issue in the
debate on communal resource management: can vilage institutions (i) provide security
against internal, and possibly also external, c1aimants, and (2) regulate the resource use
when the pressure on these resources increase, both by limiting the access by outsiders,
and constraining the exploitation by the community members. The demand put on such
institutions would c1early be much less in situations of land abundance.29
The existence and viability of such resource management instItutions vary considerably.
In the case of Seberida, the minority Talang Mamak group do have an adat system that
in some respects remain a potent institution for resource management. The Malay ethnic
group, which constitutes more than 90 percent of the traditional (non-transrngrant)
population of Seberida, lack a corporate organization for resource management apart
from the traditional vilage organization (Sandbukt, 1995: 63). Thus the two groups to
some extent resemble the distinetion made between regulated and unregulated common
property regimes in section 2. However, uncertainty related to vil age boundaries arising
from the 1979 vil age administration reform makes it difficult for the vilages to
exercise any jurisdietion. Thus, it remains an open question in our case to what extent
the traditional tenure system could have provided an efficient management tool, even in
a case when the demand on land only came from within the community.
29 See Baland and Platteau (1996) for a further discussion.
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6 Endogenous tenure (in)security in a farm household model
There has, generally , been a marked lack of formal modelling of institutional change,
which in part reflects the complexity of the issue, the many factors involved, and the
difficulties of capturing these variables and their dynamic interrelations in a model.30 It
may also be a reflection of the institutional critique of conventional positions in
econornc theory, failng to distinguish between a critique of substance and a critique of
methodology and level of formalism. We believe that much can be gained by formal
modelling by c1arifying the theory, sharpening the arguments, and ensuring consistency
between the assumptions and conclusions.
The appendix presents an formal economic model which captures some of the main
arguments in section five, and also can be applied to explain the development in the
Seberida district (section 4.3). The main results of that model are presented and
discussed in this section. The model focuses on tenure (in)security. Unlike most
agricultural household models, inc1uding the ones presented in Angelsen (1994; 1996),
tenure security is an endogenous variable; farmers choose the optimal leve! of security.
How does this extension modify or change the results of conventional econornc
models?
By tenure security is meant the probability of keeping the land.. In addition to being crop
specific (rice and rubber), tenure security depends on three variables in the model (cf.
Barzel, 1989: 2):
1. Intensity of production. Under both customary and statutory laws is a function of
the labour efforts and other investments in the cultivation of the land. Much of the
literature in the property rights school focus on the reverse link, i.e., higher tenure
security leading to higher investments. In actual fact, the causality runs both ways,
as it does in the model developed in the appendix.
2. Enforcement efforts. These inc1ude the proeess of obtaining land certificates (title
deeds) at different levels of security and costs.
3. Externalland claims. These are claims to the land by users outside the community,
against which customary law provides little protection.
The first two variables are chosen by the farmer, whereas the extent of external claims
must be taken as given. In choosing the optimal level of intensity in produetion, a farmer
not only looks at the output-enhancing effect of higher intensity, but also the
security-enhancing effect. A model with exogenous tenure insecurity gives lower
intensity compared to a full-security mode!. In the present model with endogenous
tenure insecurity, however, the leve! of intensity might be higher than in a full-security
model due to the reduced tenure-risk resulting from higher intensity.
The appendix analyzes the effects of more external land claims. The farmers' response
could well be to increase the intensity of production and the enforeement efforts; higher
"external" risk gives incentives for higher intensity and enforeement efforts to augment
tenure security. This could outweigh the conventional econornc effect of higher risk
reducing the intensity of produetion.
30 One exception is Feder and Feeny (1991; 1993).
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An increase in intensity is more likely to be the outcome if land with low intensity of
cultivation becomes relatively more probable to be lost to external claimants than
high-intens it y land. This is likely to the case in many empirical settings; increased
intens it y then becomes a strategy to secure land rights.
More external land claims could also affect the crop choice. We have argued that
perennials (rubber) gives higher protection against external c1aims than annuals (rice).
Consider a situation with no external c1aims, where rice is the most profitable crop.
Introducing tenure insecurity in the form of external c1aims could make rubber yielding
a higher expected profit than rice due to its higher tenure security. Thus other factors
than changes in relative prices rnght be important in explaining crop choice changes.
The response to the tenure insecurity incurred by external claimants predicted by the
model could, therefore, be a threefold strategy: rubber, intensification, and land
certificates. This result is in line with empirical observations in our study area òf
Seberida (section 4.3 and Angelsen, 1995a; 1995b).
Another result which goes beyond the results of conventional econornc mo dels relates
to the effect of land titling programres, which could be considered a means to reduce
the costs of enforcing property rights. It is generally argued that such programmes wil
increase the intensity of agricultural produetion by providing more secure land rights.
The effect of lower enforcement costs is, however, ambiguous in the model. We have
made the fair assumption that high intensity and enforeement are alternative means of
securing land rights. Higher enforcement efforts (land titling) wil therefore reduce the
incentives for farmers to choose a high leve! of intensity due to its security-augmenting
effect.
The possibility that the tenure security function is not globally concave in intensity and
enforcement could result in discontinuities in farmers' adaptation. Both under customary
and statutory law, it may well be that intensity and/or enforcement efforts must be
beyond a certain level to have any significant impact on tenure security. This rnght
result in large jumps in the optimal intensity and enforeement following small changes
in prices, technology or external claims.
7 Conclusions
This paper has exarnned and tried to integrate various approaches to the study of the
evolution of private property rights (EPPR) in traditional agrarian societies in general,
and the shifting cultivation system in Seberida, Sumatra in particular. We have argued
that neo-institutional econorncs (NIE) provides the most consistent and richest
framework, which also can integrate elements from the three other approaches. The
focus in NIE is on the demand for land or land scarcity, which again create increased
competition and higher land value. The boost in land value was caused by the increase
in the external c1aims for land, population growth, and improved profitability of rubber.
This is one of two key factors to explain the development over then last decade in our
study area, and represents the demand side in the "demand and supply for institutional
change" metaphor.
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The second main factor of empirical relevanee to our case study is the tension between
customary (adat) and statutory law, which is to a large extent overlapping with the
conflict between state supported external claimants (logging, transmigration, plantation,
and mining projects) and traditional, local farmers. This factor needs to be integrated in
the NIE framework. As shown in section five, it could be done by regarding the
customary and statutory law as two different institutions, providing the farmers with
different degrees and forms of protection against third party interference. This gives the
supply side in the demand-supply metaphor. The customary law gives one set of rules on
how rights are obtained and secured, basically against claims from other members
within the community. The statutory law, though it on paper recognizes customary law,
has a different set of rules. Land certificates and intensive produetion are two major
strategies to improve tenure security according to statutory law.
Increased land scarcity provides the main driving force towards individualization of the
property rights. The increase in external claims strengthen this tendency, and also makes
farmers increasingly secure their land claims in statutory law. Thus the evolution of
private property rights is reflected in both the fact that within the customar land tenure
system the individual rights are strengthened relative to common rights, and by an
increased reliance on statutory law -- which only recognize individual rights -- relative
to the customary law.
These tendeneies express themselves on the ground by changes in the shifting
cultivators' adaptation: an expansion of the area used by shifting cultivation, a sharp
increase in rubber planting -- which also represents an intensification of the system, and
an incipient tendency of obtaining land certificates. These observations are in line with
the conc1usions in the formal farm household model, which indicates that the farmers
act according to basic econornc logic. One needs, however, to extend conventional
economic models to include how farmers' decisions influence tenure security to
understand and explain the behaviour.
There are several reasons as to why one could expect the land value to increase in the
future, both in our study area and in other areas of traditional agriculture: population
growth, improvements in infrastrueture which improves accessibilty, and
environmental problems in intensive agriculture which may lead to higher food prices.
According to the NIE theory, we should therefore expect to see an increasing
individualization of land rights. To what degree this mainly takes place within the
customary law, or if customary law is replaced by statutory law, is more of a policy
issue. It depends particularly on the state's protection of rights based on customary law
and its support to external c1aimants.
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Appendix: An analytical farm model with endogenous tenure
security
The model analyzes farmers' decisions in a situation where their choices affect their land
tenure security. We consider a plo t of land, where two crops can be grown: rice (C) or
rubber (B).31 Tenure security, that is, the probability of keeping the land (q), is
deterrnned by three factors: the intens it y of production (I), the enforcement efforts (T),
for example, buying land titles32, and the external land c1aims (E), cf. the discussion in
section 6. Unlike I and T, E is not a decision variable to the farmer, and therefore
exogenous in the model.
Intensity of produetion is used as a proxy for labour inputs, but can also incorporate
other factors. If rice is selected, I could also reflect the frequency of cropping (as
measured by years of cropping divided by the years of fallow). If rubber is selected, I
could reflect the density of rubber trees (trees per ha) and the type of trees (high yielding
v. traditional low yielding varieties).
(1)
qi = qi(Ii, Ti, E); qi E (O, IL qL qL ). o; qk -( o; q~/, q~, q~T -( o; q~E' qLE ). o; i = B, C
We assume that intensity of produetion and enforcement are alternative means of
augmenting tenure security, i.e., qilT = qiTI -( O. Whereas more external c1aims reduce
tenure security (qiE -( O), it increases the marginal effect on tenure security of both
intensity and enforcement (qiiE qiTE ). O). For given values of I, T and E, rubber is
assumed to give higher tenure security than rice (qB ). qC), which is in line with
empirical observations.
Output is a concave function of the intensity of produetion, j(r). The expected net
income (V) for a particular crop from the plot can be written as;
(2) Vi(Ii, Ti;E,pi, w) = qi(Ii, Ti,E)pif(li) - wii - vTi; i = B, C
/ is the output price, w is the unit cost of intensity, for example, the opportunity costs of
labour (nominal wage rate), and v is the unit cost of enforcement, reflecting, for
example, the costs of obtaining a land certificate. This corresponds to a small, open
economy assumption (all prices are exogenous), cf. Angelsen (1996). For simplicity the
unit costs of both intensity and enforeement are assumed to be the same in both rice and
rubber production; any differences are reflected in the produetion functions. Whereas
the costs occur for certain, the value of the output (Pi.) must be multiplied by the
probability of keeping the land. We assume that farmers are risk neutral, i.e., they
maxirnze the expected income, which is another simplification that helps to concentrate
31 To simplify the model we ignore time, inc1uding the fact that rice is an annual crop, grown at certain
time intervals (rotation period) in a shifting cultivation system, whereas rubber is a perennial crop
which after a lead period of some 6-12 years (depending on the type) can be tapped for several
decades. We also abstract from the fact that rice is commonly grown the first year on the plot after
c1earance, before rubber is planted. Even if time is not modelled explicitly, the model is, in fact,
equivalent to a two-period mod el without discounting, where the costs occur in the first period and the
income in the second (cf. the somewhat different two period model in Feder and Feeny, 1993).
32 In reality this would obviously be a discontinuous variable, a fact we abstract from in this modeL.
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on the main points of the model.33 Finally, we assume that V is concave in T and I,
although this is relaxed later.
The choices for the farmers would then be:
. Which crop to select: rice or rubber?
. What should be the intensity of production?
. How much should be spent on obtaining a land certificate and other efforts in
enforcing the property rights?
The solution to these problems is partly recursive; the farmer's problem is first to
maxirnze (2) with respect to I and T for both rice and rubber, and then to sele et the crop
which gives the highest net income.
The case with tenure based on customary law only (no external claims)
We consider first an isolated community (vilage) in the sense that there are no external
land claims (E = O). The tenure system is based on customary law; we then presume that
there is no need to buy land certificates (T = O). The optimal level of intensity (I) is
characterized by;
(3) qi(Ii, O, O)/ + q~(Ii, O, O)f(Ii) = ~
Compared to a situation with full tenure security (qi = 1), uncertainty introduces two
newelements in the optimality condition. First, the fact that produetion is risky (qi .. 1)
reduces the (expected) marginal output, and therefore also the optimal intensity and
output level. Second, higher intensity augments tenure security, which pulls the level of
intensity in the other direction. Unlike in a model with exogenous tenure insecurity
(qi = q .. 1), we cannot in the present model generally conclude that the level of
intensity wil be lower than in a model with full tenure security.
The effect of an increase in the real wage iS;34
(4) -- = r 2q~ + qifn + q~t(Ii)J-! .. Od(w/p') L
The effect of, for example, an output price increase is to augment intensity of
produetion, as would be the case in a model with full tenure security. 35 This conc1usion
may, however, be modified when we also taken into account crop choice. Assume the
initial adaptation is to produee rice. The rubber price increases, and if the increase is
sufficiently large, it may induce a shift from rice to rubber produetion. The switch in
crops could reduce the intensity, particularly since rubber provides higher tenure
33 Note that higher risk (lower q) in our model implies lower expected yield. Higher risk in terms of
higher variance ("mean preserving risk") is not important as only expected values matter in the mod e!.
34 This res 
ult follows from the concavity assumption for V : Vii .. O (second order conditions for
maximum).
35 As already noted, this model do es not include time, and therefore not the rotation aspect of rice
produetion in a shifting cultivation system. We know, however, that a fores t multi-rotation model for
shifting cultivation (with exogenous tenure security) also would give that higher output price results in
intensification of the production system, both in terms of higher labour inputs and shorter fallow
periods (Angelsen, 1994).
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security than rice, and therefore may reduce the incentives for choosing a high level of
intensity due to its security-enhancing effect.
The case with external claims
In the case when there are external c1aims to the land (E :; O), the farmers have an
incentive to make some enforeement to protect the land and increase tenure security.
Assurnng an interior solution (T :; O), the optimal it y conditions are (superscripts for
crops are orntted to simplify notation);
(5) qfi + q ¡feI) = ~
(6) qrf(i) = ¡
(5) is sirnlar to (3), whereas (6) gives that the optimal leve! of enforcement is
characterized by the last rupee spend on enforcement being equal to the gain in terms of
the produetion value of the increase in tenure security.
Differentiation of (5) and (6) gives;
(7) 12q¡fl+qfI/+ql¡f(I) qr¡f(I)+qrf¡ Ji dI J
L qrf¡ + qirl(I) q1Tf(I) L dT
= I -qpji - q/F!(I) 1 O J( ~~ J
L -qrei(i) O L d:!
p
The determinant of the Hessian is assumed to be positive;
(8) D = 2q ¡fi + qfI/ + q i¡f(l) qr¡f(l) + qrf¡ :; O
qrf¡ + q irI(l) q1Tf(l)
Together with the assumption of q1T -c O, this gives the second order sufficient
conditions for maximum.
Effects of more external claims
Using Cramer's rule, the effect an increase in external claims on the level of intensity
can now be written as;
(9) :~ = -it q1Tf(l) (qpji + qiei(l)) - qrei(i)(q r¡f(l) + qrllH ~ O
There are three different effects to consider. First, higher E increases the tenure risk,
which reduces the expected marginal productivity of intensity. This is a standard effect
in the theory of the firm: reduced expected value of output (i.e., higher risk in our
model) makes the firm reduce the production. The risk is, however, also affected by the
level of intensity. More external c1aims increases the risk-reducing effect of high
intensity (qlE :; O), and this provides an incentive to increase intensity of produetion.
These effects are similar to those discussed in relation to (4). A third effect concerns the
effect on I of changes in T. As discussed below, T is likely to increase. As a high leve! of
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intensity and enforcement are assumed to be alternative means of securing land rights
(qTlo( O), this effect wil then pull in the direction of reduced intensity. The net effect on
intensity is therefore ambiguous.
The effect on the enforeement efforts of more external land claims is given by;
(10) :~ = -it q Tef(i) (2q¡f¡ + qfii + qlIf(I)) - (qTf¡ + q¡rf(i)) (qef¡ + q¡ef(i)U ~ O
The direct effect of higher competition for land in the form of more external claims is to
increase the effect on tenure security of property rights enforcement (qTE ~ O). There is,
further, an indirect effect due to changes in 1. If I is reduced (conventional case), this
provides an additional incentive to increase T. Jf I increases, this effect wil be the
opposite of the direct effect. Hence in the case when Ideereases, we can conclude that T
wil increase, whereas the net effect is ambiguous in the case when I increases following
an increase in E.
Figure 2 provides an ilustration of how intensity of produetion may depend on the level
of external claims. We stil consider only one crop. The figure assumes that T is chosen
optimally given the different levels of 1. The effect of an increase in external claims (E)
depends critically on the way it affects q at different leve Is of intensity. If the reduction
in q is the same for all levels of intensity , the effect of an increase in external claims is
equivalent to an output price reduction. The result is reduced intensity of produetion.
Rp
wl
11 12 Intensity (I)
Figure 2. The effect of externalland claims on intensity of rubbe r production.
A more realistie description would be that the effect on tenure security of external
claims is highest at low intensity leveIs, as we have assumed in the model (qEI = qlE ~
O). In Figure 2 we compare two situations; without (1) and with (2) external land claims.
Assume, for example, that without external c1aimants farmers have full security at all
1evels of intensity . When external claimants enter the scene, low intensity land is more
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likely to be lost to external claimants compared to land under intensive production.
Intensification has on the margin become more benefïcial because it increases tenure
security more than it did in the first place. The effect of more external claims may now
be to increase the intens it y of produetion, contrar to conventional economic logic
which suggests that lower expected yield (higher risk) wil reduce the scale of the
activity.
Effects of price changes
The effects of changes in the real price of intensity are;
(l l) :; = -lqTlf(!) -( O
"
(12) :~ = --l(qrf¡ + q ¡rf(!)) ~ O
"
As in the case with no external land claims, one can unambiguously conclude that
higher real costs of intensity (e.g., real wage) wil reduce the level of intensity, as
intuitively expected. The effect on enforcement efforts is ambiguous. The fact that I is
reduced and produetion declines implies a smaller harve st to protect. This reduces the
incentives to undertake enforcement of property rights. Reduced intensity , however, also
implies higher marginal gains in terms of improved tenure security of the enforcement
efforts (qlT -( O). Intuitively, one could expect the first effect to dornnate such that a real
wage increase wil lower the enforeement.
The effects of changes in the costs of enforeement are;
(13) :~ = -l(2q¡f¡ + qfff + qflf(!)) -( O
"
(14) :~ = --l(qT¡f(!) + qrf¡) ~ O
"
Higher real costs of property rights enforcement w il , as expected, reduce the
enforeement efforts. A reduction in T has two opposite effects on the optimal level of
intens it y . Again, since intensity and enforeement are alternative ways of improving
tenure security, lower T provides an incentive for higher 1. Lower T, however, also
reduces the absolute level of tenure security, which means that produetion is more risky,
which pulls in the direction in lower intensity.
Land titling programmes to provide cheaper (and more secure) titles to farmers could be
viewed as reduction in v. One argument for such programmes is that more secure
property rights wil increase the incentives for more intensive cultivation as well as
better management of the resources. Whereas this certainly is an important effect in our
model, the net effect is ambiguous; lower costs of enforeement could reduce the
intens it y of produetion because the role of high intensity in protection land rights has
become less important.
Rice-rubber choice
So far we have looked at only one crop. Figure 3 ilustrates the choice between rice and
rubber, and how this choice may be affected by external c1aims. We assume an initial
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situation with no external claim, and where rice cultivation gives the highest income;
the curve for the expected value of rice is higher than the corresponding curve for rubber
when E = O. In drawing the curves we have assumed that I and T are optimally chosen
for each leve! of E.
When introducing external claims, the expected rice-income curve wil fall more rapidly
than the expected rubber-income curve, because the fields growing rice, for example, in
a shifting cultivation system, wil have their tenure security reduced more than the
rubber fields, i.e., I qi I ;: I q~ I. When the amount of external c1aims reaches a certain
level, E*, it wil be beneficial for the farmer to switch from rice to rubber. The tenure
insecurity under rice cultivation has become so high that it has more than outweighed
the initial superior profitability of rice cultivation.36
Rp
Expected value of rubber
Expected value of rice
E' Externalland claims (E)
Figure 3. The effect of externalland claims on crop seleetion.
This ilustrates that other factors than relative prices may be important in determining
farmers' choices. The shift from rice to rubber which has taken place in the Seberida,
Sumatra could in part be explained by such tenure security considerations (Angelsen,
1995a; 1995b).
Discontinuities
So far we have assumed that the tenure security function is concave in intensity (q¡¡ c: O).
An alternative formulation is that q() is concave for small values of I, then convex for
intermediate values, before it turns concave for high values of 1. One argument for this
shape would be that there exists a kind of threshold level when it comes to the effect of
intensification on tenure security; for low intensities small intensity changes do not
affect the tenure security significantly. Related to the discussion in section 4.2, land is
stil considered under hak ulayat and receives almost no legal protection in conflcts
with "national interests ". Beyond a certain level of intens it y , the farmer could expect the
land to be under hak milk with much better legal protection. Such a shape of q() could
36 Note that the effect of a price increase discussed in the previous sub-section is easily ilustrated in this
figure, by moving up/down the expected value curves.
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make also the V - function have a convex segment for medium values of intensity , as
ilustrated in Figure 4.
Suppose we initially are in situation 1, where intensity of produetion is relatively low.
Then the output price increase or the costs of intensity (w) decrease. It is then possible to
get a large jump in intensity , as we move from the low intensity concave segment to the
high intensity concave segment of the curve for the expected value of output. Small
changes in the prices of output or intensity may therefore cause large shifts in the
intensity, even if the same crop is produced in situation 1 and 2.
Rp
wl(l)
wl(2)
1(1) 1(2) Intensity (I)
Figure 4. The case when the Vi-function has a convex segment for medium levels of
intensity.
Sirnlarly, one could argue for the possibilty that the q- function is convex in T for
intermediate values, which may cause large jumps in enforeement efforts following
small changes in, for example, the costs of enforcement (v).
Possible extensions
The above model is based on a number of simplifying assumptions, which could be
modified. The small open economy approach (all prices exogenous) could be replaced
by a situation where the households are quantity constrained in the labour market, cf.
Angelsen (1996). In that case the households' objective should be to maximize utility
rather than income. This wil introduce income effects in the comparative statics, which
could modify or even turn around some of the results. The (expected) utility approach
also allows for a discussion of risk aversion.
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